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SKETCHES FOR A HAMILTONIAN VERNACULAR
AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
Nestor M. Davidson*
INTRODUCTION
When Léon Duguit laid out his concept of the social function of property
in his Buenos Aires lectures a century ago, he had in mind not only the
general idea that ownership entails obligation, but also a quite specific kind
of affirmative duty. To Duguit, the particular role that owners play in
society requires that they put their property to productive use for the sake of
social solidarity. 1 If owners fail to live up to this developmental
imperative, Duguit argued, the state can enforce a mandate to do so as it
would any other internal aspect of property law.2
Although scholars in the United States have explored versions of the
social function of property, the vision that emerges from this nascent
discourse tends to ground the obligations of ownership in conceptions of
These are undeniably
shared sacrifice and interpersonal reliance.3
important and under-appreciated currents in the jurisprudence, highlighting
both the relational nature of property rights as well as the adaptability of the
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas that property
rights are limited by the obligation not to use property to harm others.
Understandings of the social function that parallel the particular texture
of Duguit’s productive obligation, however, have received less attention in
the United States. This is curious, because one of the earliest and strongest
conceptions of ownership in the United States reflected just this kind of
developmental norm. Like Duguit’s social solidarity, the common law
conception that property rights must foster the good of the community

* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Sheila Foster and Daniel Bonilla for organizing the symposium for which this Essay was
written, and the participants in that symposium for helpful and enlightening discussion.
1. See LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE
CODE NAPOLÉON [CHANGES OF PRINCIPLE IN THE FIELD OF LIBERTY, CONTRACT, LIABILITY,
AND PROPERTY] (1912), translated in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 75 (Joseph H. Drake et al. eds., Thomas S. Bell et al. trans., 1918).
2. Id. at 133–34. For overviews of Duguit’s articulation of the social function of
property, see generally Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, Introduction to The Social
Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (2011); M.C.
Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 191 (2010).
3. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
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reflected in the equally hoary maxim salus populi suprema lex—the welfare
of the people is supreme—had what historian William Fisher describes as a
“meaningful and powerful” influence on property law in the era between
the Revolution and the Civil War. 4 The conception of welfare that the salus
populi demanded quite often affirmatively required owners to actively use
property, and correspondingly supported an affirmative state role in social
ordering through private property to set the terms of that developmental
imperative. 5
This productivity-oriented social function contrasts in many ways with
two other conceptions of property that continue to frame the modern U.S.
discourse. 6 The first is the possessive–individualist tradition centered on
market property that reflects the classical liberal absolutism against which
Duguit was reacting. 7 The second conception is a civic republican tradition
that emphasizes property’s role in promoting civic virtue and ensuring
social order. 8 Although these conceptions are far from hermetic, and
interact throughout U.S. history, a third tradition has been explicitly
entrepreneurial in that it relies on market forces, but has not venerated
vested rights as an overarching bar to disrupting existing market structures.9
Conceptions of property rights in the United States that trace back to the
earliest days of the Republic are often associated—approvingly or
disparagingly—with members of the Founding generation, in symbolic
gestures that, for all of their reductionism, serve to highlight their
provenance and continuity. 10 Thus, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky
associates the classical liberal view with James Madison,11 although
Madison’s views on property were, like most of his contemporaries,
varied. 12 Similarly, the contrapuntal civic republican tradition is often
traced to Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman vision, 13 although, again, Jefferson
held views on property that are not easy to reduce to a monistic vision.14

4. William W. Fisher III, Making Sense of Madison: Nedelsky on Private Property, 19
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547, 555 (1993). For a general discussion of the salus populi principle
and its role in early U.S. property, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 69–90.
6. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 (1997).
7. See id. at 12.
8. Id. at 13.
9. See id. at 185–210.
10. Cf. Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values,
Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American
“Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 45–48 (2005) (discussing the contemporary
relevance of Founding-era concepts of property and society).
11. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 185–87, 207–08
(1990).
12. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 555.
13. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in
Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 470 (1976).
14. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 41–42.
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With caution, then, about the challenge of translating from the foreign
country that is the past, 15 it is possible to link elements of the salus populi
productive norm in early U.S. property law to a third, and less often
invoked, member of the Founding generation: Alexander Hamilton. 16
Hamilton, the first U.S. Treasury Secretary, laid the foundation for an active
state that would create the conditions for a modern industrial economy.
More than any other of his contemporaries, Hamilton harnessed an
awakening national government to spur development and establish financial
markets. Hamilton did so, however, in ways that sublimated individual
initiative to the good of a nascent national community.
Hamilton, as befits the breadth of his views, is often associated with the
individualist–commodity view of property, 17 and there is much to this
association. 18 Conversely, there is a republican strain of social ordering in
much of the embodiment of the Hamiltonian perspective that followed in
the first decades of the nineteenth century, albeit more a commercial than a
civic strain. 19 It is possible, however, to understand this tradition as
Willard Hurst and other historians have, as a distinctive U.S. cultural
development that sought to harness the energy of the individual to increase
the common wealth. 20 The corresponding vision of property was less
focused on freedom from the state in the classical liberal sense or
limitations on ownership that flow from harm-focused equal liberty
reflected in sic utere. Rather it sought to put property to its highest and best
use for the benefit of the community, with corresponding doctrines that
resolved disputes less in favor of vested rights than in ways that tended to
increase development. 21 Hamilton’s entrepreneurial vision of a vigorous
state unleashing and harnessing individual initiative for the common good
thus inverted Adam Smith’s invisible hand and its corresponding minimal,
contractualist state.22
This approach to the obligations of ownership has been obscured to some
extent in the contemporary discourse, but nonetheless recurs—with
ambivalence—in the doctrine. To give one example, this kind of
15. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525–26 (1995) (aptly warning about historical claims that have
reductive simplicity).
16. See James Willard Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483,
483–84 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Arthur McEvoy, Markets and Ethics in U.S. Property Law, in WHO OWNS
AMERICA? SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 94, 96 (Harvey Jacobs ed., 1991); see
also ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 77 (describing Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit as
“pure commodity thought”).
18. See WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 74 (1977).
19. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 12–13.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 69–90.
21. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 9 (1956).
22. See CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 179 (1964)
(“The release of individual energies was so important to bring about that [Hamilton]
preferred the open hand of authority rather than the hidden hand of chance to hold the
lever.”).
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developmental imperative formed an important backdrop to the affirmation
of the role of eminent domain in economic development upheld in Kelo v.
City of New London. 23 Beyond individual disputes, active state ordering of
property to enhance development is reflected in a variety of current
initiatives at all levels of government that go beyond setting what Joseph
Singer has called the “minimum standards.”24 These initiatives, as
Hamilton’s policies did, invest in the predicates for active ownership, such
as infrastructure and education. Thus, when historian Richard Wright
recently criticized proposals for a national high-speed rail initiative by
disparagingly invoking the federal government’s nineteenth century
promotion of the transcontinental railroad, 25 it was a timely reminder not
only of the endurance of this vision of property, but of the controversies it
generates.
This historical ground has been well plowed, but is worth revisiting as
interest in the social function of property is beginning to make the leap from
Europe to Latin America to the United States. This Essay, accordingly, reexamines the Hamiltonian legacy, not to mount a normative defense of the
tradition, but rather to highlight its relevance to a comparative
understanding of the social function. The Essay begins with a discussion of
the methodological implications of social function theory, focusing on
Duguit’s empiricism. It then turns to Hamilton’s vision as an antecedent to
the commonwealth norm in antebellum jurisprudence, which might be
understood as a distinctive vernacular understanding of the productivity
obligation that Duguit associated with ownership. The Essay concludes by
noting echoes of this obligation in contemporary debates about private
property and the role of the state in defining the institution.
I. METHODOLOGICAL ROOTS:
THE VERNACULAR IN THE SOCIAL FUNCTION
Methodologically, classic liberal conceptions of property tend to reflect a
hierarchy of values and assertions about the division between the state and
the individual embodied in property that ignores history and culture. If
property is understood as a pre-political, natural right, that understanding in
turn assumes that there is one overriding purpose for property, with a
normative function of shielding individual liberty from the state. This is a
moral framework largely abstracted from the practical reality of how
property is lived and was part of what Duguit was reacting to in his critique
of property as a subjective right.26 It carries a corresponding understanding
of the interaction between the individual and the state instantiated through
property that likewise obscures context. Indeed, what is striking about

23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
24. See generally Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted:
Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 139 (2008).
25. See Richard Wright, Fast Train to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at WK9.
26. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1005–06 (discussing Duguit’s empiricism).
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descriptions of property in classic liberal terms is the not infrequent
assertion of universality and absoluteness.27
By contrast, as a methodological matter, social function theory inherently
recognizes the pluralism of what Hanoch Dagan recently called “property
institutions.” 28 An emphasis on the social in property’s function, by
definition, makes clear that what society may require of an owner is always
grounded in a particular culture and specific social, economic, and political
conditions. As Duguit noted in his Buenos Aires lecture, “I am of those
who think that law is much less the work of the legislator than the constant
and spontaneous product of events,” and that by “the nature of things and
the force of events and practical needs new legal conceptions are constantly
forming.” 29 Duguit’s approach to property was thus self-consciously
empirical, seeking to divine legal rules from social reality. 30
In this way, the social function of property can be thought of as a found
object, with distinctive, local, often unmediated understandings embodied
in law. This legal residue is akin to the way that vernacular architecture
uses local resources to represent spontaneous, contextual responses to local
conditions. As Frank Lloyd Wright noted, such architecture grows “in
response to actual needs, fitted into environment by people who [know] no
better than to fit them with native feeling.” 31 Vernacularity thus
emphasizes indigenous solutions to common design problems, resulting in a
“strong community identity . . . that is manifest in distinctive qualities and
results in recognized patterns of everyday language.” 32 Such architecture
reflects organically generated responses to local conditions, 33 “‘on the
principal criteria of expression of site and climate, expression of form and
function, expression of materials and skills.’” 34
This is a fruitful metaphor for the equally organic response to political,
economic, and cultural forces that guide the development of the social
27. See, e.g., Mirow, supra note 2, at 193 (“‘[O]wners can do anything they like with
what they own . . . . [And] the owner is perfectly free to do nothing at all with the thing: in
principle, the law of property imposes no positive duties on an owner.’” (quoting F.H.
LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 2002))). Similarly, when
Blackstone famously described property as sole and despotic dominion, he prefaced the
thought with the universalist proposition that nothing “so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
28. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, at xvii (2011).
29. See DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 66.
30. See Mirow, supra note 2, at 200–01.
31. Quoted in PAUL OLIVER, DWELLINGS: THE VERNACULAR HOUSE WORLD WIDE 9
(2003).
32. THOMAS CARTER & ELIZABETH COLLINS CROMLEY, INVITATION TO VERNACULAR
ARCHITECTURE: A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF ORDINARY BUILDINGS AND LANDSCAPES 8
(2005).
33. See generally BERNARD RUDOFSKY, ARCHITECTURE WITHOUT ARCHITECTS: A SHORT
INTRODUCTION TO NON-PEDIGREED ARCHITECTURE (1964).
34. OLIVER, supra note 31, at 11 (quoting Sybil Moholy-Nagy); see also Roderick J.
Lawrence, Learning from the Vernacular: Basic Principles for Sustaining Human Habitats,
in VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THEORY, EDUCATION AND
PRACTICE 110 (Lindsay Asquith & Marcel Vellinga eds., 2006) (“Vernacular buildings are
human constructs that result from the interrelations between ecological, economic, material,
political and social factors.”).
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function in property law. Every society must confront certain recurring
points of tension inherent in private property. These include the balance
between individual freedom, collective responsibility, and limitations on
harm, as well as incentives for productive activity, recognition of personal
connection to property, and others. Society confronts these tensions
through the resolution of individual disputes, with legal institutions that
inherently draw on the values and imperatives of a given historical context.
As a result, there is no singular social function—there cannot be—and no
possibility of a transcendent, unified theory of what that function should be.
Rather every legal system must perpetually balance the plural values
represented in property. There may be some continuity and stability in the
institutional arrangements instantiated through property, 35 but as with
material resources and local conditions in architecture, the process of
contestation leaves a vernacular residue on those structures that reveal
starkly localized resolutions.
When the vernacular is channeled through professional elites, it can
produce a hybrid that melds instinct and expertise, with indigeneity
incorporating broader influences. Frank Lloyd Wright’s supposedly urdomestic U.S. prairie architecture, for example, borrowed from the British
Arts and Crafts movement and traditional Japanese architecture. 36 So too,
when legal institutions struggle to make sense of the felt needs of a culture
at a given moment, are spontaneous resolutions channeled through
professional norms. Nonetheless, the process still involves culture taking
the raw materials available to it and making pragmatic accommodations that
settle into recognizable patterns.37
Duguit, grounded in early twentieth-century Continental culture,
understood property’s social function to mean social solidarity or
interdependence. 38 He posited a kind of historical progression in which
subjective right had given way in “modern communities” 39 to the “everstricter interdependence of the various elements that compose the social
community.” 40 Duguit understood social solidarity as a question of role
differentiation, and he argued that the unique place that owners occupy in
society generates an obligation to put property to productive use. As
Duguit framed it, an owner,

35. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1644–55 (2008) (discussing property forms as stable platforms for legal
innovation).
36. See HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST
TRADITION, at xx (Michael Lind ed., 1997).
37. Methodologically, analogizing the emergence of the social function to a kind of
vernacular echoes Bruce Ackerman’s “ordinary observer” perspective on property. See
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10–20 (1977). The
analogy, however, recognizes more contingency to the norms reflected in the resolution of
property conflicts than Ackerman did.
38. See DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 75 (citing the sociological work of Emile Durkheim);
see also Mirow, supra note 2, at 202 (discussing Durkheim’s influence on Duguit).
39. DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 129.
40. Id.
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by reason simply of his possession, is enabled thereby to accomplish a
certain work where others can not. He alone can increase the general
stock of wealth by putting his capital to use. For social reasons he is
under a duty, therefore, to perform this work and society will protect his
acts only if he accomplishes it and in the measure in which he
accomplishes it. 41

As those norms have emerged, modern social obligation theorists in the
United States have begun exploring the duties of ownership. Joseph Singer,
for example, has focused on obligations that flow from reliance and the
embedded nature of social relations.42 For Gregory Alexander, the social
obligation norm in the United States is best understood in light of a
normative commitment to human flourishing. 43 In application of this
commitment, Alexander focuses on what he described as “collective
restrictions of property interests,” 44 with paradigm examples found in
nonconsensual transfers and use restrictions. 45
These are important correctives to classic liberal absolutism and healthy
reminders of the pluralism of the social function in the United States, but
they tend not to focus on what Sheila Foster and Daniel Bonilla call
Duguit’s normative commitment to a “‘rule of productivity.’”46 Duguit
himself acknowledged that, notwithstanding his commitment to empiricism,
he could point to little evidence of his social solidarity view in practice in
contemporary law. 47 But in the early development of property law in the
United States, in the era between the Revolution and the Civil War, there
was in active practice a vein in the jurisprudence that reflected this very
imperative.
II. A HAMILTONIAN VERNACULAR
The vernacular understanding of property as carrying an obligation
toward productivity reflects a tradition that can be traced back to the
balance that Alexander Hamilton sought to strike between civic obligation
and individual initiative. Hamilton can certainly be described, as he was by
a recent biographer, as “the prophet of the capitalist revolution,” 48 but
Hamiltonian dynamism reflected a conception of social obligation that

41. Id. at 133–34.
42. See generally Singer, supra note 3.
43. See generally Alexander, supra note 3.
44. Id. at 752.
45. See id. at 775–91 (canvassing what Alexander describes as “entitlement sacrifices”
and “use sacrifices”).
46. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1005.
47. DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 135 (“The objection does not embarrass me. From the fact
that the law does not yet directly force the owner to cultivate his land or repair his houses or
utilize his capital, it cannot be concluded that the idea of social function has not yet
supplanted the idea of a subjective right of property.”). Duguit’s answer to this objection
was that no such law had appeared because the need had not yet arisen. Id. How that
puzzling absence justified his view of the actual social function of ownership embodied in
law is not clear.
48. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 6 (2004).
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actively sought to harness ownership by disrupting the established order
where necessary and fostering productive property over entrenchment.
A. Hamilton’s Vision in the Federalist Papers and the Reports
As with all members of the Founding generation, it is perilous to attempt
to tie a singular strain in U.S. intellectual history to Hamilton. As Jefferson
famously wrote of Hamilton, “without numbers, he is an host within
himself.” 49 Hamilton certainly cast a certain jaundiced eye on human
nature and had little faith in the virtues of an engaged citizenry, accepting
generally that prosperity required engaging those already endowed with
wealth. 50 Hamilton is thus easy to pillory as a closet aristocrat and some
kind of unreconstructed mercantilist, but his ideas about the state’s nature
were, like those of his contemporaries, more nuanced. While not every
element of this tradition traces directly to Hamilton’s writings and the
policies he advocated, certain core principles can be identified with the
Founding Father who most directly advocated a vigorous central
government to transform the United States from an agricultural colony into
an “Empire of Commerce.” 51
Hamilton authored roughly two-thirds of the Federalist Papers, and his
views on harnessing entrepreneurial energy were evident in his case for a
strong national government. For example, in Federalist No. 12, Hamilton
defended the proposed federal government’s power to tax and to impose
duties on imports, arguing that the “prosperity of commerce is now
perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most
useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth.”52
Likewise, in Federalist No. 30, Hamilton argued that “money is, with
propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which
sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential
functions.” 53 Hamilton saw the confluence of public good and market
incentives, but did so in the context of a polemic in favor of a vigorous
government that would put these incentives to use to forge a new nation.
It was in Hamilton’s work as Treasury Secretary that his vision of the
entrepreneurial state, with its implications for property, came most fully
into view. In a series of seminal reports and opinions he authored in 1790
and 1791, 54 Hamilton articulated a fiscal policy built on his forceful
49. Quoted in ROSSITER, supra note 22, at 3.
50. See Katz, supra note 13, at 485–86 (quoting Hamilton’s argument before the New
York Ratifying Convention that the “vices” of the “wealthy” are “probably more favorable
to the prosperity of the state, than those of the indigent; and partake less of moral
depravity”).
51. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 75.
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton).
54. Hurst cites a corpus of work from 1790 and 1791 that outlined Hamilton’s vision
while Secretary of the Treasury: the Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public
Credit, which advocated funding national and state debts; the First Report on the Further
Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, on a federal excise tax; the Second
Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, recommending a
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interpretation of national powers to tax, spend, borrow, and provide a
money supply. 55 In each of these areas, Hamilton framed his policies in
terms of the potential for a vigorous national government to play a unique
role in generating private capital, diversifying the nation’s economic base,
protecting fledgling domestic industries, making strategic investments in
public goods, and, throughout, harnessing these interventions to expand the
resources available for future growth.
In his Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, for
example, Hamilton argued that funding public securities was necessary to
create a liquid money supply, which would then energize private capital for
the benefit of the new nation. 56 Public debt, supported through the taxing
power, would serve as security for private borrowing that would otherwise
never materialize. Hamilton saw the impending failure of a central sector
of the new economy and crafted an aggressive plan to shore up what would
have otherwise been a crippling credit crisis.57
Likewise, in his Report on the Subject of Manufactures, Hamilton
articulated the need for strong protection for an industrial economy,
borrowing Adam Smith’s division of labor theory and using it to build the
case for an active state role. 58 To Hamilton, supporting manufacturing in a
then-agricultural economy would “not only occasion a possitive [sic]
augmentation of the Produce and Revenue of the Society,” but also
“contribute essentially to rendering them greater than they could possibly
be without such [support].” 59 Hamilton’s argument rested on specialization
and the use of technology that would engage a broader base of employment
and encourage immigration. 60 This, in turn, would best utilize the range of
talents in society, create a greater scope for enterprise, and (so the politician
in Hamilton had to note for a skeptical agrarian audience) increase the value
of agriculture. 61 To these ends, Hamilton advocated a range of trade, tax,
national bank, and a corresponding opinion rendered at request of the President on the
constitutionality of legislation to create a national bank; and, finally, the Report on the
Subject of Manufactures, advocating a pro-manufacturing federal policy. See Hurst, supra
note 16, at 488.
55. See id. at 489–90.
56. THE REPORT RELATIVE TO A PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC CREDIT (Jan. 14,
1791) [hereinafter REPORT ON PUBLIC CREDIT], reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 65 [hereinafter PAH].
57. Hamilton grounded his argument, particularly for funding at face value debts that
might have been purchased at steep discounts, in part on the value of certainty for holders of
debt. See id. at 73–78. Hamilton thus certainly understood instrumental reasons for the
sanctity of property at the same time his policies presaged a massive shift from older, landbased forms of wealth to new property based on manufacturing and financial assets.
58. See supra note 22.
59. REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (Dec. 5, 1971), reprinted in 10 PAH
249.
60. Id. Hamilton did argue that one advantage of manufacturing was that it would
enable women and children, “persons who would otherwise be idle (and in many cases a
burthen on the community),” to come more easily into the workforce. Id. at 253. Needless to
say, this advocacy for the labor of children (“many of them,” Hamilton noted with favor, “of
a very tender age,” id.) is anachronistic, but was hardly out of the ordinary in the eighteenth
century.
61. Id. at 249.

1062

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

and investment policies, including internal improvements, direct subsidies,
research support, and import protections.62
Hamilton’s functionalism reflected his grave doubts about the ability of
market forces to fulfill their function, particularly in a new nation
competing with strong foreign powers. As Hamilton argued in his Report
on the Subject of Manufactures, there were “very cogent reasons” to believe
that industry needed federal assistance, given
the strong influence of habit and the spirit of imitation—the fear of want
of success in untried enterprises—the intrinsic difficulties incident to first
essays towards a competition with those who have previously attained to
perfection in the business to be attempted—the bounties premiums and
other artificial encouragements, with which foreign nations second the
exertions of their own Citizens in the branches, in which they are to be
rivalled. 63

What emerges from the range of Hamilton’s work in this era is a vision
that drew on the power of an active, vigorous state to guide, protect, and
structure the market to foster, quite literally, the common wealth.64 This
was not a vision—for all of Hamilton’s recognition of the instrumental
value of honoring the public debt (and the sanctity of contract more
generally)—that inherently privileged vested rights in order to promote a
market economy as such, but rather that favored entrepreneurship and
productivity. This vision had implications for the construction of property
law in the United States. 65 Ownership was not a passive activity or a basis
for preserving social order, but rather an affirmative tool to harness
entrepreneurship for the sake of collective development.66
In advancing Hamilton’s policies, with the creation of a national bank,
the assumption of Revolutionary Era state debt, and the funding of federal
debt, the objects of property were expanded from land to more abstract,
62. See generally id.
63. Id. at 266.
64. Hamilton may have personally favored more libertarian approaches to the market,
but his pragmatism recognized the necessity of intervention. In 1801, Hamilton responded
to critics of his plans by noting that
[t]o suggestions of the last kind, the adepts of the new-school have a ready answer:
Industry will succeed and prosper in proportion as it is left to the exertions of
individual enterprise. This favorite dogma, when taken as a general rule, is true;
but as an exclusive one, it is false, and leads to error in the administration of public
affairs. In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to be left free in
the main, not fettered by too much regulation; but practical politicians know that it
may be beneficially stimulated by prudent aids and encouragements on the part of
the Government.
THE EXAMINATION NO. III (Dec. 24, 1801), reprinted in 25 PAH 467.
65. On an abstract level, the Hamiltonian program was explicitly utilitarian. See GERALD
STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 25 (1970)
(quoting Hamilton’s observation that “utility is the prime end of all laws”). The exercise in
this Essay, however, is not to limn a generalist approach to property but rather to undertake
something of the opposite: to work from traces in the U.S. discourse of property to isolate
one vernacular understanding of a social function.
66. See Hurst, supra note 16, at 522–33 (discussing Hamilton’s view that advancing the
national public interest required accepting a measure of benefit to certain elements of the
private sector, particularly entrepreneurs, over others).
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mobile, dynamic sources of wealth. In Hamilton’s broader program of
economic development through finance and infrastructure investments,
moreover, there was recognition of the intertwining of individual initiative
and state support. Instrumentally, property was not sacrosanct for its own
sake; rather, Hamilton’s vision required the active use of property and a
national government that could match that ambition. 67 It has frequently
been noted that Hamilton’s vision, of all of the Founders, most prefigured
the modern state into which the United States grew, 68 and this
understanding of the active harnessing of individual initiative was a
distinctive, novel conception at the time.
B. Commonwealth and the Release of Energy as a Social Function
The kernels of the productivity social function that Hamilton sought to
unleash grew widely in property law in the first half of the nineteenth
century, as the developing nation embraced doctrines that shaped ownership
to advance an understanding of the common good that included an
affirmative obligation to use resources productively. 69 Across a number of
domains, property law and policy recognized an imperative that reversed
the Lockean labor–reward paradigm. Instead of being granted property
67. As Willard Hurst noted, “Hamilton believed with wholehearted fervor that the public
interest required not simply a national government well endowed with authority, but a
government in hands that would use that authority with creative energy.” Id. at 486. It is
beyond the scope of this Essay to elaborate on the intersection between what Hamilton’s
vision meant for property and federalism. Suffice it to say that Hamilton had a distinctly
national perspective while, in the antebellum period, much of the locus of property doctrine
that reflected the social vision Hamilton articulated was at the state level.
68. See, e.g., HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note 36, at xiv (“[H]owever powerful
Jeffersonian rhetoric remains in American public discourse, it is the Hamiltonians who have
won the major struggles to determine what kind of country the United States would be.”).
69. Cf. Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American
Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 830 (1993) (noting that for Hamilton, property rights were
instrumentally linked to what Hurst would call the “release of energy,” harnessing the selfinterested pursuit of wealth for national development).
This is not to suggest that structuring private property to recognize an affirmative
obligation to utilize property for the collective benefit of the community began with
Hamilton. It was a central feature of property law in the Colonial era as well. As John Hart
noted:
Colonial lawmakers often regulated private landowners’ usage of their land in
order to secure public benefits, not merely to prevent harm to health and safety.
Indeed, the public benefits pursued by such legislative action included some that
consisted essentially of benefits for other private landowners. Legislatures often
attempted to influence or control the development of land for particular productive
purposes thought to be in the public good. Legislatures compelled owners of
undeveloped land to develop it, beyond what was required by the original grants,
and compelled owners of wetlands to participate in drainage projects. Owners
risked losing preexisting mineral rights if they failed to conduct their mining with
sufficient promptness. Owners of land suitable for iron forges risked losing their
land if they declined to erect such forges themselves. In towns and cities,
landowners were constrained by measures intended to channel the spatial pattern
of development, to optimize the density of habitation, to promote development of
certain kinds of land, and to implement aesthetic goals.
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257 (1996).
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rights in recognition of work done in a pre-political, natural-rights sense,
property rights were recognized upon the condition—implied or explicit—
that work must be done. 70
As Willard Hurst famously described this ethos, it was not “the jealous
limitation of the power of the state, but the release of individual creative
energy that was the dominant value.” 71 Thus, where “legal regulation or
compulsion might promote the greater release of . . . energ[y],”
policymakers in the United States “had no hesitancy in making affirmative
use of law.” 72 As Hurst put it, “[T]here was nothing merely negative about
the tone of life in the nineteenth-century United States. . . . We were a
people going places in a hurry. Men in that frame of mind are not likely to
be thinking only of the condition of their brakes.” 73 Thus, the focus of the
law was not on “protecting those who sought the law’s shelter simply for
what they had; our enthusiasm ran rather to those who wanted the law’s
help positively to bring things about.” 74
Hurst cites, for example, the way that bankruptcy law, which developed
originally to protect creditors, came to emphasize instead the means through
which debtors could be rehabilitated to venture in business again. 75
Similarly, debtor relief legislation and corporate franchise cases in this era
sacrificed vested rights in favor of state action to foster further enterprise.
Hurst quotes Justice Taney’s decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 76 which he describes as capturing this gestalt of “property as an
institution of growth rather than merely of security.” 77
Cases throughout the early nineteenth century resolved conflicts between
more or less productive uses of common resources in ways that
subordinated vested rights. This can be seen, for example, in mill cases
where courts in the nineteenth century began validating the right of private
millers to flood neighboring land without consent (albeit with
70. Eric Claeys has argued for a kind of Lockean account of property grounded in what
he sees as purposive use that satisfies life conveniences, as opposed to an absolute right to
exclude. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics,
and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1398–404 (2010). It is beyond
the scope of this Essay to engage directly with Claeys’ argument; it is worth noting,
however, the apparent tension within the natural rights tradition between absolutism and
dynamism, in light of the strains in early U.S. property law that favored the productive
impulse over exclusionary norms.
71. HURST, supra note 21, at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id. at 26.
76. 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
77. HURST, supra note 21, at 27–28 (“‘While the rights of private property are sacredly
guarded, we must not forget, that the community also have rights; and that the happiness and
well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.’” (quoting Charles River
Bridge, 36 U.S. at 422)). This view about the centrality of productivity in this era is not
without its critics. See Harry N. Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History:
The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744, 752 (1970); see also
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 185–210 (challenging Hurst’s narrative). This is a reminder
that the productivity obligation was by no means the only approach to property during that
era and that this historical record is far from self-evident.
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compensation), and later expanded this right to a variety of manufacturing
enterprises. 78 In water law more generally, common law doctrines that
protected owners against interference with resources in their natural
conditions began to yield to conceptions of reasonable use and public
benefit with an explicitly pro-development orientation.79
A similar theme runs through the delegation of the eminent domain
power to private industry and the broader recognition of a private right of
condemnation in some states. 80 As Harry Scheiber argued, courts across
the country in the first half of the nineteenth century validated the
delegation of eminent domain power on “turnpike, bridge, canal, and
railroad companies.” 81 Courts had also recognized a variety of facilitating
doctrines that made the use of eminent domain by the state easier, including
offsets to lower the cost of delegated condemnation and the power to alter
the scope of projects once commenced, notwithstanding objections from
neighbors. 82 Private delegations of eminent domain carried these powers
with them, Scheiber notes.83
Public infrastructure, much of it developed through mixed public and
private enterprises, also invoked the common good to foster active use of
property in the face of assertions that such use interfered with existing
rights. For example, what William Novak described as the “early American
transportation revolution” came with doctrines such as injunctions against
interference with public lands and ways and uncompensated damage—
damnum absque injuria—where public infrastructure caused consequential
harm to private property. 84
Hamiltonian dynamism was reflected in early public land policy as well,
where congressional acceptance of the western lands previously held by
Virginia and the Louisiana Purchase brought the federal government into
possession of vast tracts of land. 85 The policy of alienating public lands is
often understood as either expanding the class of landholders in a
Jeffersonian vein or as privatizing the public domain.86 Hamilton sought to
dispose of public lands in large part to raise revenue, 87 but also to develop
an explicitly national community and ensure the most advantageous use of
that community’s collective resources. Again, private ownership in this
disposition was tied to a bargain in that it relied on productivity. This thrust
of national public lands policy expanded in the early decades of the
nineteenth century, as federal public lands were used not only for direct
78. See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource
Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973).
79. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at
32–33 (1977).
80. See Scheiber, supra note 78, at 235–40.
81. Id. at 237.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 128–29.
85. See Paul W. Gates, An Overview of American Land Policy, 50 AGRIC. HIST. 213, 219
(1976); Hurst, supra note 16, at 536 n.140.
86. See, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 17, at 96–97.
87. See generally Gates, supra note 85.
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development, but also for creating the infrastructure necessary to release
individual initiative, including support for education, interstate commerce,
and active migration. 88
Across the range of doctrines, commonwealth norms and the salus populi
principle were understood to be internal, inherent aspects of property, not
external impositions on an otherwise well-demarcated private sphere.89
Thus, the needs of the community were intrinsic to law’s recognition of
property rights, with courts comfortably recognizing a variety of regulatory
and developmental imperatives. 90
In short, in the early development of property law in the United States, an
organic perspective emerged under which an active government intervened
to foster growth and favor entrepreneurship over entrenchment. This alltoo-brief excursion flattens a great deal of rich history, and sidesteps myriad
debates about the forces that shaped these norms in property law. Indeed,
this strain in the jurisprudence has been examined by legal historians for
what it reveals about interest group politics, democratic theory, and the
history of regulation, among other perspectives. It can also be understood,
however, as a vernacular social function that, for all of its controversy,
represented a contextual response to the felt necessities of a newly
developing nation.
III. CONTEMPORARY ECHOES OF A HAMILTONIAN SOCIAL FUNCTION
In the contemporary dialectic between property as negative liberty and
the obligations of ownership, the harnessing of individual energy by an
active state for the good of the community has faded as a distinctive,
articulated trope. In practice, however, a vision of property that
affirmatively harnesses ownership for collective development has never
really gone away in the United States.91
These historical echoes, for example, may provide a way to understand
the pedigree of current controversies over the use of eminent domain for
economic development upheld in Kelo v. City of New London. 92 In their
88. Id.
89. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 9–10, 21–22.
90. Id. at 21.
91. This discussion moves from early nineteenth-century property developments to the
present day without delving into the many significant developments in between. It remains
conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court in the period between the Civil War and the
New Deal constitutionalized much of the classical liberal view of property, although the
cross-currents were much more complex than a simple formalist turn, and earlier
commonwealth conceptions continued to play a significant role in property law. See
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 248–76. Likewise, post-New Deal acceptance of the limits of
property rights in the modern administrative state has been a prevailing, but not absolute,
sentiment, and the pull of classical conceptions remains strong. Nonetheless, it should
suffice to note that the developmental imperative that seemed so evident in the early
evolution of property law in the United States tends to receive less attention in contemporary
debates.
92. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality
under the Public Use Clause of the exercise of the power of eminent domain delegated to the
New London Development Corporation, a private, non-profit community development
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dissents in Kelo, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas emphasized the
violence to fundamental norms of private property that they saw in the
decision. As Justice O’Connor phrased it, the Kelo majority abandoned the
“long-held, basic limitation on government power” that bars a compensated
transfer from one private owner to another “who will use it in a way that the
legislature deems more beneficial to the public.”93 Justice Thomas went
even further, arguing that the Framers had embodied in the Fifth
Amendment Blackstone’s assertion that “‘the law of the
land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable
rights of private property.’” 94
The Kelo majority, and to a certain extent Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence, responded to these assertions by emphasizing the importance
of judicial deference and the political process underpinnings of
Another way to understand what Kelo
governmental discretion. 95
represents, however, can be found in Justice Stevens’s citation to
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases involving disputes over
resistance to governmental support for private development. To bolster his
interpretation of the Court’s longstanding view of the breadth of public use,
Justice Stevens cited early mill cases that allowed private developers to
flood neighbors, 96 cases involving private takings to promote the working
of important industries, 97 and other examples of private productive use
favored in law over assertions of the right to exclude or to be free from
other interference.98

organization. The Corporation had been tasked with redeveloping the economically
distressed Fort Trumbull neighborhood at the center of New London, Connecticut from a
largely residential neighborhood into a mixed-use development. See id. at 473–75.
93. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *135);
see also id. at 510 (“Blackstone rejected the idea that private property could be taken solely
for purposes of any public benefit. ‘So great . . . is the regard of the law for private
property,’ he explained, ‘that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community.’” (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *135)).
95. Id. at 477–78 (majority opinion) (noting that although it would violate the Public
Use Clause “to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit,” the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo would
have been “executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan”); id. at 491
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the record
to see if it has merit . . . .”).
96. See id. at 479 n.8 (majority opinion) (citing Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of
Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 619–24 (1940)).
97. See id. (“‘The mining and milling interests give employment to many men, and the
benefits derived from this business are distributed as much, and sometimes more, among the
laboring classes than with the owners of the mines and mills. . . . The present prosperity of
the state is entirely due to the mining developments already made, and the entire people of
the state are directly interested in having the future developments unobstructed by the
obstinate action of any individual or individuals.’” (quoting Dayton Gold & Silver Mining
Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 409–10 (1876))).
98. See id. at 480 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. 200 U.S. 527,
531–32 (1906) (affirming a mining company’s transport of ore over another’s private
property); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158–64 (1896) (upholding an
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These cases are significant not because they support the outcome in Kelo,
which was doctrinally unremarkable in light of modern public use
jurisprudence stretching back more than half a century. 99 Instead, they are
significant because they reaffirm the continuity of the essentially
Hamiltonian insight about the obligation of owners to advance the
commonwealth in a particular entrepreneurially oriented way. Thus,
collective decisions to force the productive use of property—to obligate
owners to expand the common resources available to the community—are
at least as deeply rooted in U.S. culture as the Lockean absolutism that sent
Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas into paroxysms in their dissents.
It is fair to ask what can normatively justify the sacrifices that the
plaintiffs in Kelo were required to make. 100 The point here is not to defend
the merits of what New London did in prioritizing the potential to create
greater opportunity in a severely economically distressed community over
the plaintiffs’ attachment to their homes. Rather, the point is to recognize
that an understanding of the obligations of ownership that privileges
productive use has a long pedigree in the culture of property in the United
States.
Framed as a vernacular U.S. understanding of the obligations of
ownership, it is possible to see Hamiltonian echoes in other current
property-related policy disputes beyond local economic development.
Controversies over the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC)
allocation of rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, for example, have been
compared to similar questions about the balance between market forces and
private entitlements in public lands. 101 As the FCC is now contemplating
reallocating spectrum from broadcast television to more productive wireless
communications services, 102 the FCC’s arguments for the public interest in
redirecting this resource, staked by certain incumbents, toward more
productive use is supporting active ownership in a way that would likely
have sounded familiar to Hamilton.103
Federal investments in the predicates for national growth and the
productive use of property in a Hamiltonian vein continue to meet claims of
irrigation district’s sale for the nonpayment of assessments of an owner unwillingly included
in the district)).
99. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.”).
100. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 781–82.
101. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental
Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1705 (1999).
102. See Innovation in the Broad. Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing &
Improvements to VHF, 19 FCC Rcd. 16,498 (Nov. 30, 2010) (notice of proposed
rulemaking).
103. See, e.g., id. at 16,502 (“It is essential to our nation’s economic future that the
demand for a robust mobile broadband infrastructure is met.”). Not surprisingly, spectrum
reallocation has sparked age-old arguments about the threat to vested rights and existing
entitlements. See Edward Wyatt, A Clash over the Airways, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, at
B1.
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undue interference with private property. 104 High-speed interstate rail lines,
green infrastructure such as a new national energy grid and energy retrofit
financing, federal investments in education, and many other policies are
contemporary echoes of the vision of an engaged national community
intervening to push markets toward collectively beneficial outcomes.105
Indeed, national attention remains focused on stimulus policy as a whole,106
which is a continuing source of controversy. 107
In the end, solutions that policymakers reach for in pragmatically solving
recurring problems continue to inform our understanding of the social
function of property. In the broader culture, commentators have argued for
the continuing relevance of a distinctive tradition that stretches back to
Hamilton, 108 and that tradition carries with it a correspondingly distinctive
vision of the obligations of ownership that has been a part of the U.S.
discourse, for better or worse, from the outset.
CONCLUSION
The idea of the social function of property does not yet come easily to
mind when discussing property in the United States, although that is
beginning to change. Substantively, however, Duguit’s conception of the
obligation to put property to productive use for the sake of social solidarity
is not entirely unfamiliar in the U.S. culture of property. This Essay’s
rough sketch of a Hamiltonian tradition that includes an impulse towards
productivity does not, of course, map on to Duguit’s perspective in all of its
particulars, which is hardly surprising. To take seriously the imbedded
nature of the social function means looking less for universal norms and
more for the granularity of the solutions that a given culture develops to a
set of particular challenges. Nonetheless, the extent to which this strain in
the jurisprudence resonates with the essential elements of Duguit’s
understanding is striking. 109 In this tradition, the good of the community
and the commonwealth were inherent in the meaning of property, not
imposed on a pre-political right, which meant that ownership included
104. See, e.g., Charles Rowley, Socialism, Not Keynesian Economics, Motivates the
Obama Administration, CHARLES ROWLEY’S BLOG (July 12, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://
charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/socialism-not-keynesian-economics-motivatesthe-obama-administration/.
105. This is not to claim the broad sweep of Keynesian economic policy for the realm of
the Hamiltonian tradition, but rather to highlight a few contemporary flashpoints with
parallels to Hamilton’s developmental program.
106. See, e.g., Michael Cragg & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Should the Government Invest, or Try
to Spur Private Investment?, 8 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1 (2011).
107. See, e.g., Editorial, The Stimulus Tragedy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7–8, 2009, at A10.
108. See Debate, The Two-Party System Is Making America Ungovernable, INTELLIGENCE
SQUARED U.S. (Feb. 15, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://intelligencesquaredus.org/wpcontent/uploads/Two-party-021511.pdf (statement of David Brooks) (“[W]e’ve got two
parties in this country, but we’ve got three movements. The first . . . believes in using
government to enhance equality. The second. . . believes in limited government to enhance
freedom. But starting . . . with Alexander Hamilton . . . [another] believed in limited but
energetic government to enhance social mobility, to give people the tools to compete.”).
109. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1008–10.
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affirmative obligations, among which was a kind of dynamism that favored
productivity.
Identifying this entrepreneurial approach to dynamic property as a U.S.
vernacular social function is not to defend its normative desirability. It is a
point well taken that focusing on increasing the resources available to the
community obscures the important distributional questions that must
follow. 110 There is much to be said, moreover, for the alienation that can
flow from alienability, 111 and the harms—social and environmental—that a
developmental imperative can bring are manifest. 112 But those appropriate
notes of caution should not obscure the comparative point that in grappling
with what the social function of property might mean in the U.S. context, it
is instructive to find echoes of Duguit and remember that for all of the
particular distinctiveness of each legal culture, there are commonalities as
well.

110. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 778 n.127 (“‘[A] gain in social wealth, considered
just in itself and apart from its costs or other good or bad consequences, is no gain at all.’”
(quoting RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 246 (1985)).
111. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 35–36.
112. See, e.g., John Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 569, 584–86 (1996).

